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rule, which power exists only if there is an actual suit
pending. 7
The power to grant discovery being also limited by the
rule to the production of matter that is material to the case
at hand, tends to limit the instances in which discovery
may be had before issue. Although the test of relevancy in
a motion for discovery of documents and property is not
as strict as that which governs admissibility of evidence
upon trial, 8 the court nevertheless may defer discovery
until pleadings have progressed to a point where the issues
are more clearly defined. In this area the court has a greater
degree of freedom, and thus, some will be fairly liberal in
construing this condition so as to allow discovery before
issues are really defined. 9
In the final analysis it appears that discovery is not being
denied because the rule is interpreted as prohibiting discovery before joinder of issue, but because certain conditions precedent to discovery have not been met so that the
court has not the power to grant discovery. If an action is
pending and the court has jurisdiction and all requirements
of the discovery rule are met to the satisfaction of the court,
it will have ample authority and discretion to allow discovery before answer has been filed.2"
VINcENT R. GROH
Right Of A Defaulting Building Contractor To Recover
In Maryland Upon The Contract Or In
Quasi Contract
Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead'
The appellee, a contractor, brought suit to recover the
balance due on a written contract for the clearing and grading of the site of a threatre plus certain extras, less the cost
of completing a part of the work and damages for the delay.
1' Egan v. Moran Towing & Transportation Co., 26 F. Supp. 621 (S. D.
N. Y., 1939); United States v. American Locomotive Co., 6 F. R. D. 35
'(N. D. Ind., 1946). In Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 84 F. Supp. 740 (M. D.
'Pa., 1949), a motion for discovery was held improper where a court order
had temporarily suspended the court proceedings.
18Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 34, 28 U. S. C. A. 296, n. 23.
'9 Woods v. Kornfeld, 9 F. R. D. 678 (M. D. Pa., 1950) ; Sutherland Paper
Co. v. Grant Paper 'Box Co., 8 F. R. D. 416 (W. D. Pa., 1948) ; Piest v. Tide
Water Oil Co., supra, n. 9; Employers Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. Blue Line
T. Co., supra, n. 9; Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co.,
supra, n. 9; Hallman v. Gross, 190 Md. 563, 59 A. 2d 304 (1948).
Supra, n. 10.
1206 Md. 610, 112A. 2d 901 (1955).
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Under the terms of the contract appellee agreed to supply
necessary materials, clear the land, grade the site, construct a drainage ditch and install 200 feet of pipe. The
feature of the case with which this note is herein concerned
is that relating to the non-performance by the appellee of
a part of the contract namely, failure to construct a drainage ditch and install 200 feet of pipe. Appellant claimed
that because of this non-performance, the appellee should
not be allowed any recovery. The court, nevertheless, held
(1) that there was substantial performance in that the construction of the drainage ditch and installation of pipe involved work costing only $1,000 in a $13,000 job; (2) that
the drainage ditch and pipe were not essential for the functioning of the threatre; (3) that the appellee's breach was
not wilful.
The court in reaching this conclusion said:
"'It is a general rule that a party who has deliberately and wilfully breached a contract cannot recover
thereunder for part performance .... However, some
courts have allowed recovery on the basis of quantum
meruit or quasi contract.' The hardship of the rule
requiring strict performance when applied to a contractor who, in good faith, has substantially performed
compared to the inequitable advantage that it gives to
an owner who receives and retains the benefit of the
contractor's labor and material, has led to a qualification that the contract price, less allowance to owner for
deviations may be recovered." 2
The court in restating the law applicable to the rights
of a defaulting plaintiff might have provided lower courts
with a more sure guide for the future if it had clearly distinguished cases in which: (1) The plaintiff is seeking to
recover upon the contract for substantial performance, (2)
The plaintiff is seeking to recover in quantum meruit for
partial performance, or, (3) The plaintiff has wilfully
breached the contract thereby precluding any recovery
whatsoever. A failure to make such a distinction by the
court may result in an erroneous application of accepted
principles, in the use of the wrong measure of damages, and
create needless uncertainty.
By making such a distinction, the Maryland law may be
stated as follows: (1) Recovery "upon the contract" will
be allowed a contractor who in good faith endeavors to perform his contract in full and who succeeds in performing it
IIbid, 621.
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substantially though not in strict compliance with its requirements. The defendant in such a case is allowed compensation for the defects in performance.' (2) Recovery
in quasi-contract will be allowed a contractor who in good
faith performs part of a contract if his failure to complete
is due to a legal excuse or if the defendant has received and
accepted the benefits of the plaintiff's labor.4 (3) No recovery will be allowed a contractor who has wilfully
breached the contract, either upon the contract or upon a
quasi-contractual remedy.5
Once the distinctions have been made there arises the
problem of the proper application of these doctrines to the
particular circumstances confronting the court. As in so
many areas of the law, the problem here is not one of definition but of application. If plaintiff is attempting to recover
on his contract, he must show that his performance has
been at least "substantial",6 but the question which arises
is: how much must the plaintiff do before his performance
qualifies as substantial? The courts have developed various
tests to guide them in deciding whether there has been substantial performance. One of the most widely used of such
tests is the ratio between that left unperformed and the
total performance promised.7 This ratio seems to be illustrated in the case of Robinson Construction Co. v. Barry.'
The court there allowed recovery upon a contract calling
for the installation of 1700 feet of radiation, treating the
failure of the plaintiff to install 76 to 154 feet of such radiation of minor character not going to the essence of the contract. Another test relied upon in substantial performance
81Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md. 652, 147 A. 790 (1929).
(1913), Sec. 175.

See also:

WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS

'Robinson Con. Co. v. Barry, 135 Md. 275, 108 A. 688 (1919).
5 Helmer v. Gels, 149 Md. 86, 131 A. 34 (1925).

6At early common law the doctrine of substantial performance was unknown due to the fact that promises were treated as Independent, each
party to the agreement having a right to sue the other for non-performance
without first alleging his own performance or tender of performance unless
one promise was expressly made conditional on the other; Pordage v. Cole,
I Wins. Saund. 319, 85 Eng. Rep. 449 (1669). With the passage of time,
however, the mutual dependency of promises came to be recognized and enforced; Kingston v. Preston, 2 Doug. 689 (1773). It is at this point that
the doctrine of substantial performance first made its appearance in the
courts. In the leading case of Boone v. Erye, 1 H. BI. 273, 273, 126 Eng.
Rep. 160, 160 (1777), the court in allowing recovery stated:
"... where mutual covenants go to the whole of the consideration on
both sides, they are mutual conditions, the one precedent to the other.
But where they go only -to a part, where a breach may be paid for in
damages, there the defendant has a remedy on his covenant, and shall
not plead it as a condition precedent."
73 CORBIN, CONTRcrs (1951), Secs. 705-706.
' Supra, n. 4.
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cases is the ratio of cost of completion and curing of defects
in performance to the total contract price. The higher the
ratio of the cost of completion to the total contract price,
the less likely that the performance rendered is substantial
performance.' This ratio appears to have been applied in
the Evergreen Amusement Corp. case 10 where in a contract
having a cost of $13,000, the plaintiff's performance was
considered substantial, although it would require another
$1,000 to complete the job. In Hammaker v. Schleigh," a
contract calling for the remodeling of defendant's building
at a cost of $23,000 was said to be substantially performed,
even though $500 worth of work remained to be done.
While these ratios may be helpful, a great majority of
the cases present problems which require the court to evaluate such intangibles as the character of performance promised, the purposes and ends it was expected to serve on
behalf of the defendant, and the extent to which the plaintiff's non-performance has defeated those purposes and
ends.12 In PresbyterianChurch v. Hoopes Co.," the court
said a prayer based upon the theory that, absent an acceptance, there should be no recovery upon the contract to a
plaintiff whose performance was not only at variance with
the terms of the contract, but had defeated the purpose for
which the defendant had contracted, should have been
granted. The defendant had specified that the stone to be
used in building a parsonage was to be of a gray color, in
order that the parsonage would match the adjoining church
in color. The stone used by the plaintiff, however, was
"streaked, speckled, spotted, and of a variegated and unsightly appearance"."
Any attempt by the courts to lay down a hard and fast
rule or formula to determine when there has been substantial performance would amount to price conjecture; for as
Corbin in his treatise on Contracts puts it:
"When we use the term 'substantial performance of
a promissory duty', we always mean something less
than full and exact performance of that duty.
"... what amounts to 'substantial performance'...
is always a question of fact, a matter of degree, a ques9

Loc. Cit., 8upra, n. 7.

10Supra, n. 1.

1 Supra, n. 3.
Loc. Cit., supra, n. 7.
66 Md. 598, 8 A. 752 (1887).
"Ibid, 602.
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tion that must be determined relatively to all the other
complex factors that exist in every instance."1
Assuming the plaintiff has not substantially performed
may he, nevertheless, recover in quasi-contract for his part
performance? The answer to this question has given the
courts a great deal of difficulty. According to Williston:
"A satisfactory solution is not easy, for two fundamental legal policies seem here to come in conflict.
On the one hand, it seems a violation of the terms of
the contract to allow a plaintiff in default to recover to allow a party to stop when he pleases and sell his
part performance at a value fixed by the jury to the
defendant who has agreed only to pay for full performance. On the other hand, to deny recovery often gives
the defendant more than fair compensation for the injury he has sustained and imposes a forfeiture on the
plaintiff."'16
The decisions handed down by the Maryland courts clearly
reflect this conflict. If the plaintiff has not fully or substantially performed, his remedies no longer exist upon the
contract itself; his recovery, if any, must be founded upon
one of the common counts in assumpsit, in particular, the
count for work and labor. 7 The basic rule laid down by the
courts is that where the plaintiff has performed part of an
executory contract and then wilfully and without legal
excuse refuses to perform the rest of it, he cannot recover
in general or special assumpsit. 5 The courts, however,
have in many instances believed the application of this
rule to be too harsh and have grafted various expections
on to it. One of the most common exceptions by the courts
is discussed in the Robinson Construction Co. case. 9 Here,
the court held that if the plaintiff performed in good faith,
although not in the manner prescribed by the contract,
and the defendant sanctioned or accepted the work, he
could recover under the count for work and labor for the
reasonable value of the work done and accepted, the defendant having a right to recoup for damages caused by the
CORBN, op. cit., 8upra, n. 7, P. S. 765, 767.
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed., 1937), 4118.
1 POE, PLEADING & PRACTICE, (Tiffany's Ed., 1925), Sec. 101. In Maryland

the court for work and labor is also applicable to a situation in which plaintiff has fully performed and all that remains is payment of money. See
Denmead v. Coburn, 15 Md. 29 (1860) ;and Lohmuller Bldg. Co. v. Barrett,
146 Md. 617, 127 A. 482 (1925).
"'North Bros. & Strauss v. Mallory, 94 Md. 305, 51 A. 89 (1902) ; Heinse
v. Howard, 153 Md. 380, 138 A. 250, 255 (1927).
" 135 Md. 275, 278, 108 A. 688 (1919).
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deviation. The court went on to add that this acceptance
may not only arise through the defendant's acquiescence,
but by implication, as when "the other party has stood by
and seen him prosecute the work without objection, and
been benefited by his labor and materials...
In several instances, however, the Maryland court has
been more influenced by the legal policy of not allowing a
plaintiff in default to recover, that is, to stop when he
pleases and sell his performance to the defendant, then it
has been by the fear of imposing a forfeiture upon him.
In the PresbyterianChurch case,2 ' the court in discussing
the possibility of plaintiff recovering in quantum meruit
said:
"But he (the defendant) is not obligated to accept
anything else in place of that which he has contracted
for; and if he does not waive his right, the other party
to the contract cannot recover against him without performing all the stipulations on his part."2 2
In Pope v. King,2 8 the court went so far as to say that the
use of a building by the defendant will of itself not amount
to acceptance if such use is "under circumstances which
negative the intention of the owner to accept the work..."I'
In both the PresbyterianChurch and Pope cases, the court
had first to consider whether plaintiff could recover upon
the contract, i.e., was there substantial performance? Upon
finding that performance was not substantial, the court
then considered the plaintiffs' right to recover in quasicontract. Because the court could find no acceptance on the
part of the defendant or legal excuse for plaintiffs' failure
to complete, the plaintiff was denied recovery, even though
he was not a wilful defaulter. The phrase without legal
excuse is often used by the courts when denying recovery
to a plaintiff who has only partly performed. By applying
the affirmative of the phrase, a plaintiff may recover for
part performance (assuming no acceptance by the defendant) if his failure to complete is due to a legal excuse.
Legal excuse has been held to mean rescission of the contract by the parties, prevention by act of defendant,2 5 and
21 Ibid, 279.

Supra, n. 13.
IbTid, 603. Parenthetical material supplied. See also North Bros. &
Strauss v. Mallory, supra, n. 18, which adopted substantially the same view.
=108 Md. 37, 69 A. 417 (1908). (Builder failed ;to obtain an architect's
certificate which was an express condition precedent.)
Ibid, 46.
Denmead v. Coburn, supra, n. 17; Hammaker v. Schleigh, 157 Md. 652,
147 A. 790 (1929).
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impossibility by act of God or of law.26 Thus, while the
law is such that there can be no recovery for part performance in Maryland unless the plaintiffs' failure to perform
is due to a legal excuse, the courts in order to avoid a forfeiture may imply an acceptance when there is a subsequent retention of the fruits of plaintiffs' labor by the defendant, thereby imposing upon such defendant a quasi-contractual liability.
The final question to be answered involves the intention of the defaulting plaintiff, i.e., does the wilfulness of
the plaintiff bar any and all recovery upon the contract or
in quasi-contract? The rule stated in Maryland is that a
builder who wilfully and without legal excuse abandons
the work after a part performance can recover nothing for
what he has done." The actual effect of this rule is hard
to determine even when the cases referring to it are examined. In many cases it appears to be merely dictum in
that judgment is given to the plaintiff either in quasicontract or upon the contract. In others, while the courts
state that the plaintiff being wilful cannot recover, the
plaintiff's performance is such that he would be entitled to
no recovery had he performed in good faith. Nevertheless,
because the doctrine of wilfulness precludes a plaintiff from
recovering in all instances in which it is present and because of its constant recital by the courts, it is worthy of
consideration and exploitation in each case, either by the
defendant or the plaintiff.
In summary, the Evergreen case, while failing to make
these distinctions, was decided properly.28 Since plaintiff's
performance was held to be substantial, he was entitled to
recover upon the contract less damages for incomplete performance. On the other hand, had plaintiff's performance
been treated not as substantial, but only as partial, his
remedy would be only in quasi-contract. In this situation,
the court would then have to see if there was a legal excuse
for not completing the drainage and installation work, or
whether the defendant had sanctioned or accepted plaintiff's partial performance. Furthermore, this case sheds no
light on the effect of wilfulness on plaintiff's right to recover because the performance was substantial and the
' McLaughlin v. Reinhart, 54 Md. 71, 80 (1880).
21 Gill & Vogler, 52 Md. 663 (1879).
'0 For a discussion of whether the case could have been considered on
grounds that the contract was divisible, see Heinse v. Howard, 8upra, n. 18,
and Jenks v. Clay Products Co., 138 Md. 551, 115 A. 123 (1921). If the
contract is divisible, the plaintiff may recover upon the contract for his
performance; whereas in cases where the contract is not divisible his
remedy, if any, for part performance would be restricted to quasi-contract.
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plaintiff was held not to have acted in bad faith. Whether
a Maryland court would deny recovery to a plaintiff who
has substantially performed but acted in bad faith as yet
has not been decided. The court's opinion, however, may be
slightly misleading in that it suggested the possibility of a
quantum meruit recovery by a wilfully defaulting plaintiff.
Such is not a possibility under the law as it stands in Maryland today. Furthermore, a recovery in quantum meruit
for part performance is separate and distinct from recovery
upon the contract for substantial performance although the
court in its opinion failed to distinguish the two. Such a
distinction may be absolutely necessary for a proper determination of rights, liabilities and remedies in many cases.
As an illustration of the necessity of such a distinction
in a later case, Baltimore Luggage Company v. Ligon, 118
A. 2d 665 (Md., 1955), a contract involved the excavating
and removal of earth for a parking lot. A dispute arose as
to the interpretation of the contract, and the jury held that
the Luggage Company's version was the correct one. The
contractor completely performed the contract as he interpreted it, but refused to complete as to the Luggage Company's version claiming that to do so would render him a
trespasser on another's property. The trial court submitted
several issues to the jury: (1) Did the contractor fully complete the contract? The jury answered no; (2) Did the contractor do any extra work, and if so, its value? The jury
answered yes, and that the extra value was $377.00; (3)
What was the value of excavation actually done by the contractor? Jury answered $3,185.32 less payment of $2,389
or $796.32 still due; (4) Did any acts of the Luggage Company delay work on the contract? The jury answered, no.
The trial court entered a judgment for contractor for
$1,048 which was $796.00 plus $377.00 for extra work, the
trial court reflecting in its judgment the jury's apparent
finding that contractor was justified in refusing to perform
an illegal act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment
stating that a plaintiff may recover in quantum meruit for
his part performance when his failure to complete is due to
impossibility by act of law.
While the case was decided in accord with prior Maryland cases, nevertheless, the trial court in giving its instructions to the jury failed to distinguish between recovery
upon the contract and recovery in quantum meruit. Nor
did it inform the jury concerning the significance of prevention or impossibility of performance by the contractor.
The jury should have been asked to determine whether
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there was substantial performance entitling the contractor
to recovery upon the contract; or if they found his performance not substantial whether the contractor could recover
for part performance under quantum meruit. In the latter
instance the jury would have to find that the contractor's
performance was either accepted by the Luggage Company
or rendered impossible by act of God or law. The verdict
returned by the jury failed to disclose upon what grounds
plaintiff was allowed to recover, thereby giving rise to
speculation concerning the measure of damages. If the contractor has not performed according to the contract, his
remedy is restricted to quantum meruit with damages based
upon reasonable value and not contract price. Such a distinction can have a substantial effect upon amount of recovery and, therefore, should be made in each case in order
that the recovery allowed is in accord with the remedy
afforded.
HERBERT

A.

SEMAN

Recent Decisions
Accession - Replacement Motor Becomes Part Of Autobile. Allied Investment Company v. Shaneyfelt, 74 N. W. 2d
723 (Neb. 1956). An action in replevin was brought by the
assignee of a conditional sales contract, duly recorded, to
recover a car held by defendant to secure his improvement
lien for a new motor put in the car at the request of the conditional vendee but without the knowledge or consent of
the vendor, the vendee having defaulted on both car and
motor. On plaintiff's appeal from a judgment granting him
replevin less the value of the motor, held, reversed. The
motor, being a vital, integral part of the car, became the
property of the conditional vendor upon installation by the
doctrine of accession, free of any liens the priority of which
he did not approve.
While the Court of Appeals of Maryland has not had
occasion to pass upon the law of accession to personalty,
there are several cases on improvements to real property.
Typical of the Court's view on this subject is Warwick v.
Harvey, 158 Md. 457, 148 A. 592 (1930). One who makes
improvements on land, even though he has constructive
notice of his lack of title, is not deprived of the benefit of
compensation for said improvements.

